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I. Introduction
The Spanish Constitution, approved in 1978, was a key instrument
in the democratization process that began in 1975. The fathers of the
constitution sought to agree on the principles that would sustain the
new juridical order, which they felt should convey the evolution of society, the juridical developments, and the new patterns proposed by
comparative law. Their prime concern was drafting a constitution that
would obtain the approval of all, or at least the majority of, the political
parties.1 This led to a compromise with some institutions—mostly
those with an ethical or moral foundation—that consequently shaped
the constitution’s text. As a result, controversies over the interpretation
of some sections of the constitution have often arisen as legislators take

* Associate Professor of Law, University of La Coruña (Spain). PhD Jurisprudence,
University of Santiago de Compostela. Visiting scholar and lecturer at several universities in Europe and the United States. Author of five books on marriage law and relations between church
and state and more than thirty articles and book chapters in European and American journals.
Member of the Spanish Royal Academy of Law and Jurisprudence and Executive Secretary of the
International Academy for the Study of the Jurisprudence of the Family. This paper was presented at the Symposium on Whether Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage Is Constitutionally Required
at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, November 2,
2012.
1. See Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, May 23, 1978, No. 72,
p. 1155; Pedro Farias, Breve Historia Constitucional de España 30 (1981).
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steps to develop certain rights and liberties that the constitution recognizes. This has happened with some of the fundamental rights, including the right to life, the freedom of education, and conscientious
objection, just to mention some. Controversy also followed the right
to marry, which although not included among the fundamental rights
and public liberties in the Spanish Constitution, does figure among the
rights and duties of Spain’s citizens.2
In July 2005, the article of the Spanish Civil Code that contains
the definition of marriage (Same-Sex-Marriage Law) was amended.3
The modification seemed very simple—article 44 stated, “[m]en and
women are entitled to marry in accordance with the provisions of this
Code,”4 and the amendment added “[m]arriage shall have the same requirements and effects when both prospective spouses are of the same
or different genders.”5 Other articles were also modified to replace the
words husband and wife with cónyuge or consorte—gender-neutral words
similar to the English spouse or progenitor, designating fathers and
mothers without distinguishing sex.
When the procedure for amending the civil code to allow samesex marriages began, a flood of reports and statements issued by public
and private institutions arose, and a predictably overwhelming number
of articles passionately supporting or opposing this legal change. Expectedly, a lawsuit asking for the repeal of the amendment of the civil
code was brought before the Constitutional Court as soon as the
amendment came into force.6

2. The relevance of this structure comes, among other reasons, from the different protections that Spain’s citizens enjoy. All rights and freedoms are binding on all public authorities,
will be regulated by law—which must respect their essential content—and can be protected
through appeal to the Constitutional Court. Constitución Española [C.E.] art. 53.1, Dec.
29, 1978, Boletín Oficial del Estado [B.O.E.] n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). Fundamental
rights enjoy stronger protection; citizens may assert claims to protect the fundamental freedoms
and rights outlined in the Constitution “by means of a preferential and summary procedure before the ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by lodging an individual appeal for protection
(recurso de amparo) to the Constitutional Court.” C.E. art. 53.2.
3. Amending the Civil Code Concerning the Right to Marry (B.O.E. 2005, 13) (Spain),
available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/07/02/pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf [hereinafter SameSex-Marriage Law].
4. Id. at art. 44.
5. Id.
6. S.T.S.,
Nov.
15,
2005
(Spain),
available
at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/11/15/pdfs/A37313-37313.pdf.
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For complicated political reasons, the Constitutional Court did
not pass a judgment until November 2012—seven years later.7 The
ruling upholds the Same-Sex Marriage Law.8 It is a lengthy judgment
that considers all the reasons posed by the plaintiffs as well as the opinions of the public institutions that offered their stance on the topic,
including the Council of State,9 the General Council of the Judiciary,10
and the Royal Academy for Jurisprudence and Legislation.11
Even though this Constitutional Court ruling was supposed to end
the harsh debates of past years, this article will not focus solely on that
judgment. There are two reasons for this: First, while the judgment
says that the Amendment of 2005 is constitutional, it does not say that
regulating same-sex marriage is constitutionally required, instead leaving the door open to a new bill that may reinstate marriage as a union
between a man and a woman. Second, the aforementioned reports and
statements were issued by qualified institutions that reached a different
conclusion than the Constitutional Court. Therefore, although the

7. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012 (S.T.C., No. 198) (Spain), available at http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/23106.
8. Id.
9. The Council of State is the Spanish Government’s supreme consultative body. Consultations in regard to bills are not compulsory, but the Government decided to ask for a report
from this body because of the importance of the matter. The Council of State observed that, due
to the problems posed by this amendment, it would have been desirable to ask for reports from
other institutions, both public and private, in order to achieve a better knowledge of the scope of
the proposed law and its potential effects. See Dictámenes del Consejo de Estado [Council of
State Opinion], Dec. 16 2004, (B.O.E., Dictámenes del Consejo de Estado, No. 2628/2004)
(Spain) [hereinafter Report of the Council of State], available at http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?coleccion=consejo _estado&id=2004-2628.
10. The General Council of the Judiciary is the governing body of judges and courts. It
can issue reports on the bills that relate to the protection of the fundamental rights. The government and this council did not agree that the government was obligated to ask for a report from
the council on this particular bill, and the Secretary for Justice denied the request from the council to send the bill. The council nonetheless decided to deliver a report. See “Estudio” del Consejo
General del Poder Judicial sobre el matrimonio homosexual, Directorio de Codigos Civiles (Jan.
2005) http://www.codigo-civil.net/archivado/?p=467 [hereinafter Report of the General Council of
the Judiciary]. The problem underlying this controversy was the ideological differences between
the government and the General Council of the Judiciary, due to their respective composition at
that time. The first pages of the report are devoted to justifying the powers of the council to
release this item, called a “study” instead of report. See id.
11. The Royal Academy for Jurisprudence and Legislation has among its aims the research, appraisal, and contribution to the improvement of the law. The report issued on this
Amendment of the Civil Code, dated March 1, 2005, is published in Anales de la Real Academia de
Jurisprudencia y Legislación, n. 35, 937 (2005) [hereinafter Report of the Royal Academy].
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Constitutional Court has made its decision regarding the constitutionality of this modification of the Civil Code, public institutions are far
from agreeing on the matter.12
This article first analyzes the portion of the Spanish Constitution
devoted specifically to marriage. It then examines the main juridical
reasoning to uphold or dismiss the constitutionality of the 2005 SameSex Marriage Law. Finally, it gives brief attention applicable statistics,
taking into consideration the numbers offered by the government before the approval of the Bill and the reality in the subsequent years.

II. Marriage in the Spanish Constitution
The Spanish Constitution states in section 32:
1. Man and woman have the right to contract matrimony with full
legal equality.
2. The law shall regulate the forms of matrimony, the age and capacity for concluding it, the rights and duties of the spouses, causes for
separation and dissolution and their effects.13

The first thing that comes to mind is that the wording of this section neither explicitly requires nor bans same-sex marriage. This is
quite understandable given when the constitution was enacted—only
three years after the regime of General Franco came to an end.14
Same-sex marriage, as well as other relationships like polygamy or civil
partnerships, were not among the main concerns of the authors of the
constitution.15 But, it would be difficult today to hold a debate on marriage that does not mention same-sex marriage at all. Other topics like

12. I will not consider in this paper all the juridical literature on the matter because it is
not possible to convey all the scholarly opinions, valuable as they are. I will also set aside other
problems posed by this amendment not directly related to same-sex marriage as a right, such as
the powers of the regional entities (comunidades autónomas) to legislate on this matter, or the filiation or adoption by same-sex couples.
13. C.E. art. 32.
14. This regime was characterized, among other features, for an entanglement between
the Catholic Church and the State. For more on this issue, see Juan Ferrando Badia, El
régimen de Franco; Un enfoque político-jurídico (1984).
15. See Amending the Civil Code Concerning the Right to Marry, supra note 3. The preface of Same-Sex-Marriage Law recognizes that the marriage laws from the last century did not
need to refer to same-sex marriage in any way because homosexual relationships were considered
by no means able to bear out a marital relationship.
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divorce (not allowed then), or the recognition of canon law marriages
were the focus of their attention instead.16
The question we should ask ourselves, then, is whether section 32
of the constitution implicitly allows a law recognizing same-sex marriage. The most important item to highlight is that this section uses
the words “man” and “woman” instead of “all persons,”17 “all” or “everyone,”18 “citizens,”19 “all citizens,”20 “Spaniards,”21 or “all Spaniards.”22 This is the only section that makes explicit the gender distinction, so it may be significant.
One common understanding is that the mention of equality between men and women in the conjugal relationship refers to the unequal husband and wife relationship that existed up until a few years
before the enactment of the constitution. During that time women
were subject to their spouses’ will, and required their husband’s permission for a number of juridical acts.23 The constitution interdicts
this difference of status—the guarantee that the inequality that had existed until then could not be permitted to continue, it had to be reflected in the constitutional text.24
But, the equality of men and women is already recognized in section 14 of the constitution, and there was no need to reiterate it.25
Constitutions do not usually repeat their declarations. Moreover, the
gender equality before the law stated in section 14 enjoys stronger protection than the assertions of section 32.26 Therefore, the section related to marriage must be considered distinct from this mention of
men and women.

16. The Judgment of the Constitutional Court admits it, without any reservation. See FJ
8.
17. C.E. art. 24.1.
18. Id. at art. 15, 24.2, 27.5, 28.1, 31, 43, 44.
19. Id. at art. 9.1, 18, 23.
20. Id. at art. 9.2, 41.
21. Id. at art. 19.
22. Id. at art. 2, 3, 29.1, 35.1, 47.
23. Diego Espín, La igualdad conyugal en la reforma del código civil, in El Nuevo Derecho
de Familia Español (Jose Maria Castán ed., 1982).
24. See Judgment of the Constitutional Court FJ 8.
25. C.E. art. 14 (“Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other personal or social
condition or circumstance.”).
26. See id. at art. 53.2 (“Any citizen may assert a claim to protect the freedoms and rights
recognized in section 14 and in division 1 of Chapter 2, by means of a preferential and summary
procedure before the ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by lodging an individual appeal for
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According to the reports, the mention of men and women introduces the heterosexual element of the marital relationship.27 This is
also the interpretation stated in the 1994 Resolution of the Constitutional Court, which affirms that:
[T]he heterosexual element of the marriage stated in the Civil Code
is consistent with the Constitution. Public authorities can grant advantages to the family constituted by a man and a woman in opposition to homosexual unions. It does not preclude the legislator from
enacting a regime where homosexual partners may enjoy the same
rights and legal advantages that marriage offers.28

In another paragraph within the text, the Constitutional Court said
that “the union between persons of the same biological sex is neither a
regulated juridical institution or a constitutional right; on the contrary,
marriage between man and woman is a constitutional right.29 The
judgment of the Constitutional Court on the Same-Sex Marriage Law
also refers to this resolution, but in rather complicated and confusing
terms. The court tried to dismiss the previous interpretation by saying
that Section 32.1 cannot be understood as the establishment of the
heterosexual principle of marriage.30 However, the court added that it
also cannot be understood to mean that the heterosexual-only option
was excluded. It arrives at the conclusion that considering marriage as
only a heterosexual union, and not granting marital benefits to samesex unions, would be consistent with the constitution.
There are two other sections in the constitution closely related to
Section 32 that would support the principle that the constitutional text
only permits heterosexual marriage. One is Section 39. Section 39
mandates the protection of the family and asserts the commitment of
public powers to the protection of mothers and children. This provision indicates that the drafters had a heterosexual family in mind.31
protection to the Constitutional Court.”).
27. See Report of the Council of State, supra note 9; see also Report of the General Council of the
Judiciary, supra note 10.
28. Sentencia Tribunal Constitucional [S.T.C], July 11, 1994 (S.T.C., No. 222) (Spain),
available at http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/16344.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. C.E. art. 39. The section reads:
1. The public authorities ensure social, economic and legal protection of the family.
2. The public authorities likewise ensure full protection of children, who are equal
before the law, regardless of their parentage, and of mothers, whatever their marital
status. The law shall provide for the possibility of the investigation of paternity.
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The Constitutional Court does not endorse that interpretation, and
instead proposes another reading: marriage and family are addressed
in different sections of the Constitution—therefore, families do not
necessarily stem from marriage and can be based on other relationships
that should be protected as well.32 The other section is 58, part II, concerning the crown, that reads, “The Queen consort, or the consort of
the Queen, may not assume any constitutional functions, except in accordance with the provisions for the Regency.”33 Again, the drafters
had heterosexual relationships in mind. Certainly these two sections
are not decisive, but they are a clue to understanding the idea of marriage that those who drafted the constitution intended to convey.
In sum, the Spanish Constitution protects heterosexual marriage.34
Homosexual unions can be granted the same benefits as marriage, but
Section 32 of the constitution does not grant the same protections to
homosexual marriage.35 However Section 32 also does not expressly
ban same-sex marriage, and defers to the legislature the regulation of

3. Parents must provide their children, whether born within or outside wedlock, with
assistance of every kind while they are still under age and in other circumstances in
which the law so establishes.
4. Children shall enjoy the protection provided for in the international agreements
safeguarding their rights.
32. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, available at http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion
/Show/23106.
33. C.E. art. 58.
34. I will focus on Spain, but this conclusion is in line with the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights. Just a week after the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court was
released, the European Court of Human Rights issued a ruling asserting, once again, the definition of marriage as a heterosexual union:
The Court reiterates that Article 12 of the Convention is the lex specialis for the right
to marry. It secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry and to found
a family. Article 12 expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national law. The
Court points out that Article 12 of the Convention enshrines the traditional concept
of marriage as being between a man and a woman (Rees v. the United Kingdom, 17
October 1986, § 49, Series A no. 106). While it is true that some Contracting States
have extended marriage to same-sex partners, this reflects their own vision of the role
of marriage in their societies and does not flow from an interpretation of the fundamental right as laid down by the Contracting States in the Convention in 1950 (see
Parry v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 42971/05, 28 November 2006; R. and F. v.
the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 35748/05, 28 November 2006; and Schalk and Kopf
v. Austria, no. 30141/04, § 58, ECHR 2010).
H. v. Finland, App. No. 37359/09, at 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012).
35. See C.E. art. 32. The legislator who drafted the Same-Sex-Marriage Law was aware of
this statement because the preamble avoids the foundation of same-sex marriage in Section 32.
Instead, the preamble uses the negative reasoning (Article 32 does not proscribe it) and alludes
to other articles that may support the regulation of same-sex marriage.

449

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 27

marriage in general. Thus the next question is whether the legislature,
when regulating marriage, is bound by other sections of the constitution that would demand the recognition of same-sex marriage.

III. The Right to Freely Develop the Personality
The preamble of the Same-Sex-Marriage Law states that the right
to freely develop a personality demands a juridical framework, which
would include same-sex marriage.36 It makes clear that the fostering of
equality and freedom regarding the different forms of cohabitation requires a regulation that conveys these values, and cites Sections 9 and
10 of the constitution in support of this idea.37
According to Section 9(2) of the constitution:
It is the responsibility of the public authorities to promote conditions
ensuring that freedom and equality of individuals and of the groups
to which they belong are real and effective, to remove the obstacles
preventing or hindering their full enjoyment, and to facilitate the
participation of all citizens in political, economic, cultural and social
life.38

Section 10(1) deals more specifically with this matter when it says,
“The dignity of the person, the inviolable rights which are inherent,
the free development of the personality, the respect for the law and for
the rights of others are the foundation of political order and social
peace.”39
In compliance with the constitution, freedom and equality must
pervade all juridical acts, and failing to accomplish it will certainly be
reproved. It would be difficult, however, to assert that people were not
free to establish same-sex unions, and even to obtain most of the benefits of marriage, before the Same-Sex Marriage Law.40 Still, being
36. Amending the Civil Code Concerning the Right to Marry B.O.E. n. 157, Jul. 2, 2005
(Spain). The right to the free development of the personality played a similar role in Spain to the
one that the right to privacy did in the United States in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); or Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), among
others. So, although the right to personal and family privacy is recognized in the Spanish Constitution, the Same-Sex-Marriage Law does not mention it.
37. See C.E. art. 1.1 (“Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic State, subject
to the rule of law, which advocates freedom, justice, equality and political pluralism as highest
values of its legal system.”).
38. Id. art. 9.1.
39. Id. art. 10.1.
40. An interesting detail is that the Council of State introduces a reference to the different
situation in the U.S. in this regard. The Report says that the high degree of controversy over
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free to establish a same-sex union is different than including that relationship in the definition of marriage, which poses other problems.
The Council of State deals with this reasoning in the Report. It
affirms that the free development of personality did not demand opening marriage to same-sex couples. Even more, that right would be better protected if there were different patterns of cohabitation, each one
with its own specific regulation, and people could choose the one they
prefer. This would not oblige people of same-sex orientation to enter
into a relationship whose juridical regime was designed to meet a different reality. As far as same-sex couples are a newly accepted pattern
of cohabitation, the most coherent attitude is enacting a new accurate
regulation for this pattern, one that meets its own necessities, without
forcing it into a different regime. Basically, different institutions demand different juridical regimes. This would also avoid the juridical
uncertainty that stems from a global application of the marriage legislation to another institution, which would require the intervention of
case law to resolve any doubts or conflicts that may arise.41
It is worth remembering that the Spanish Constitution does not
link family, mentioned in Section 39, only with marriage, cited in Section 32.42 The Council of State deduces from this structure that stating
a different way of granting benefits to marriages and same-sex couples
is consistent with the constitution.43
The Government did not agree with the Council of State. They
argued that banning same-sex couples’ access to marriage entailed constitutionally prohibited discrimination against homosexuals. I analyze
this reasoning in the next section.

IV. The Principle of Nondiscrimination
Section 14 of the constitution, cited above, establishes that there
may not be any discrimination on the basis of sex “or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.”44 Sexual orientation is not

same-sex marriage in the United States may be explained because in several States including
same-sex couples in the marriage definition or not doing it determines the granting or refusal of
marriage benefits to those couples. Spain neither had that problem nor is affected by conflicts
similar to those posed by the Defense of Marriage Act and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 22.
41. See id. at 21–22.
42. See Same-Sex-Marriage Law, supra note 3.
43. See Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 23.
44. See C.E. art. 14.
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mentioned in this section. It is different from sex, which alludes to a
biological feature, but it can fall under the protection of this section,
considering it a personal condition or circumstance. We can then assert that this norm prevents the public authorities from any act that
may involve discriminating against homosexuals.45
Apart from that, Section 18 of the constitution protects the right
to personal and family privacy.46 Sexual relationships are included in
the scope of this section.47 According to the usual interpretation of this
section, not only is the spreading of information without consent forbidden, but it also prohibits the interference of the public powers in
punishing a personal behavior that is socially accepted, as would occur
with homosexual relationships.
Having stated what public authorities cannot do, we must consider
what they can do. More precisely, we should find out whether the nondiscrimination principle demands opening the marital relationship to
same-sex partners. This was, in fact, the main alleged reason to enact
a law that will enable marriage between same sex couples in Spain—it
would accomplish a claimed goal, the recognition of a fundamental
right to homosexuals that had long been ignored. This idea, widely
spread from media and government sources,48 led a considerable
amount of people to the conviction that, finally, everybody would have
the same rights.
Here we come to one of the key points of the debate. It is an essential principle in democratic countries that everybody enjoys the
same fundamental rights. Hence, homosexuals have the same rights as

45. See S.T.C., Nov. 28, 2012 (mentioning that homosexuality is one of the classifications
that deserves strict scrutiny).
46. C.E. art. 18.1 (“The right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own
image is guaranteed.”).
47. See Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 5.
48. Among other things, the Secretary for Justice, with a rather complicated expression,
said that the Bill:
extends the rights of citizenship, at the same time that go deeper in the freedom and
equality with which those rights are implemented, because its aim is removing a ban
of inequality that lasted hundreds or thousands of years; there have been centuries of
negative inequality and discrimination against some people on grounds of their sexual
orientation. Because such people, that have the same dignity than the others, have seen
their rights denied, and have been discriminated for a long time, this Bill looks forward
to implement the constitutional mandate of nondiscrimination.
Press Report on the comments from the Vice-President María Teresa Fernández de la Vega and
the Secretary for Justice Juan Fernando López Aguilar (Oct. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/ruedas/_2004/r0110040.htm.
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heterosexuals—no more, no less. Homosexuals and heterosexuals have
the same right to marry in the same way. That is to say, everybody has
the right to marry somebody of a different sex, since marriage was defined as the union of a man and a woman. Therefore, the law that allowed same-sex marriage was not recognizing a fundamental right that
had been previously denied to homosexuals and that discriminated
against them. There would have been discrimination if the right to
marry were denied to homosexuals, or if their sexual orientation prevented them, for example, from becoming civil servants or performing
a public duty or any other such function. Similarly, it would be discrimination—in this case, against heterosexuals—if same-sex marriage
were open only to homosexual couples. Marriage required two persons
of a different sex. No one—irrespective of sexual orientation—could
marry anybody of the same sex.
Therefore, when the Same-Sex Marriage Law was drafted, its real
aim was not the recognition of a right denied to homosexuals until
then. It was changing the definition of marriage to remove the heterosexual element; in other words, changing the definition of marriage
in order to include relationships composed of two people of the same
sex as well as two people of the opposite sex. Actually, the Law did not
open marriage only to homosexual couples; it opened it to all same-sex
partners, without regard to their sexual tendency. The Council of State
followed this reasoning when it said that:
[T]he opening of marriage to same sex couples does not entail a
broadening of the candidates for marriage, recognizing the right of
same-sex couples which is not protected in the Constitution; it leads
to a modification of the marriage institution, that requires from us an
answer to the question whether this modification is affecting marriage to a greater extent than allowed by Section 32.49

The Council sheds further light on this matter:
[T]he removal of discrimination based on sexual orientation does not
require the inclusion of a new pattern of couple in the marriage institution. On the one hand, because reserving marriage to heterosexual couples does not convey a discriminatory treatment, neither from
the perspective of the Constitution or the International Treaties on
Human Rights; on the other hand, discriminations that can arise in

49. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 15.
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society are not wiped out through the legal configuration of a marriage that includes two different realities (moreover, this solution
might even make it difficult to control those discriminations).50

It is important to be mindful that in Spain, same-sex couples enjoy
the same benefits as married couples. Even if marriage equality were
not available to same-sex couples, there is no restriction on the rights
and benefits the latter might enjoy, as opposed to what happens in
other countries. Therefore, the aim of removing any discrimination
pursued by the Same-Sex Marriage Bill had no real content except for
the name of marriage, and might be achieved by means other than the
modification of the definition of marriage.
From another perspective, there is discrimination when different
treatment of two comparable realities has no justification. In Spain,
however, a family built from heterosexual marriage enjoys the protection of the constitution; homosexual partnerships do not enjoy this
same protection, as already demonstrated. Even more, the total equivalence between heterosexual marriage and marriage without the heterosexual element is not possible, as the juridical problems posed by
the regulation of marital filiations disclose.51 As such, reserving marriage for heterosexual couples alone is not discriminatory insofar as
there are reasons to do so. While the reasons to act this way may or
may not be politically defendable, they are nonetheless accurate from
a juridical point of view.

V. The Reasoning Behind the Institutional Guarantee
The Judgment of the Constitutional Court devotes its largest part
to the reasoning behind the institutional guarantee of marriage that,
according to the Court, might be the only grounds to consider the
Same-Sex Marriage Law inconsistent with the constitution.52
The idea of the institutional guarantee is easy to understand and
to endorse. It pursues the protection of certain institutions regulated
in the constitution that can be considered structural or constitutive elements of the society, protecting them from legislative action that
50. Id. at 21.
51. See id. at 23 (explaining that other problems may arise, for example in the field of
inheritance law, international law, division of marital assets, and so on.); see, e.g., Decision of the
Secretary for Justice, Department of Registries and Notaries, of July 25, 2005, B.O.E. n. 188,
Aug. 8, 2005 (Spain) (discussing the law applicable to marriages between a Spaniard and a foreigner).
52. S.T.C., Nov. 28, 2012.
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could suppress or essentially alter their nature.53 It is more difficult,
however, stating what the essential content of a certain institution is,
how that falls under that guarantee, and what features are contingent.
The Constitutional Court did not shed light on the matter. In an early
ruling, it said:
The institutional guarantee does not affirm a precise content once
and for all, but the preservation of an institution in a way that were
recognizable for the idea the social conscience has build in every time
and place. That guarantee is ignored when the institution is in such
way limited that it result deprived from their existence as institution
to become just a name. These are the limits for their development
and implementation. Hence, the only prohibition clearly stated is the
departure from the plain and clear idea commonly accepted of the
institution, which, as a juridical institution, is in a wide extent determined for the law in force.54

This is a highly relevant statement that helps explain the Constitutional Court’s decision on the Same-Sex Marriage Law.
As already said, the Judgment of the Constitutional Court on the
Same-Sex Marriage Law affirms that opening marriage to same-sex
couples is not required by the constitution, but it can be allowed. The
institutional guarantee of marriage in Section 32 would be the only
possible grounds to ban it.55 But the Constitutional Court was not
alone in realizing the central role of the institutional guarantee on this
issue. The Report of the Academy and the Report of the General
Council of the Judiciary also pay special attention to the institutional
guarantee, although they arrived at the opposite conclusion from the
Constitutional Court.
The institutional guarantee of marriage means that its essential elements cannot be changed according to the social context or to a general understanding of its aim and function. The alterations in marriage
regulation may apply only to accessory elements. The Council of State
accurately expressed this idea:
53. Id.
54. S.T.C., July 28, 1981.
55. See Same-Sex-Marriage Law, supra note 3. The Same-Sex-Marriage Law also implicitly assumes this interpretation, because it does not appeal to Section 32 of the Constitution to
support the introduction of this new feature in the Civil Code, because it is not a strong enough
rationale for the legalization of same-sex marriage. Instead, the preamble says that Section 32
describes marriage as “a manifestation” of personal relationships based on affection, and it mentions other sections of the Constitution that would back up the amendment of the Civil Code.
Same-Sex-Marriage Law, supra note 3.
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The institutional guarantee prevents the alteration of the marriage
institution further than its own nature allows; it does not exclude that
lawmakers could adapt the guaranteed institutions to the spirit of the
time, but they cannot do it on a way that makes them unidentifiable
by the social conscience of time and place.56

With the issue of same-sex marriage, the conflict arises when we
come to determine whether the heterosexual feature is essential to the
definition of marriage; in other words, whether the institutional guarantee includes it, or if it could be changed according to the decision of
lawmakers on grounds of social acceptance or any other reason. Here
the disagreement begins, and two opposing positions are clearly defined. The Constitutional Court maintains that the heterosexual element is not part of the essential content of marriage; rather, it belongs
to the “traditional” idea of marriage, which is no longer the only or
even the more relevant idea in today’s society.57
The other position, held by the Royal Academy and the General
Council of the Judiciary, takes into consideration that the heterosexual
element is an inherent characteristic of the marital union, and therefore, cannot wholly be determined by the concepts of law. If society
demands the juridical recognition of a certain kind of union that implies the discharging of the heterosexual element, another law should
regulate it, but the definition of marriage cannot be broadened to include those unions. I will examine the main arguments posed by both
positions.
The ruling of the Constitutional Court uses the “accommodation
to modern life” as the main reason to consider the Same-Sex Law consistent with the constitution. The Court admits that there was no real
intent to include same-sex unions in the marriage definition when the
constitution was enacted.58 But constitutions demand an “evolving
reading” as a way to reassure their legitimacy and make them operational throughout time. Then, concepts must be construed according
to the social perception in the sense that the only changes not permitted would be those that made an institution not fully recognizable to

56. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 28.
57. This expression (“traditional” marriage) is used, for example, in the Decision of the
Secretary for Justice, supra note 51, it entails a shade of historical and temporary meaning, not in
the sense of something that has always existed, but of something that existed in certain times and
places but can disappear without major concern. The Report of the General Council of the Judiciary warns of this nuance on the meaning of the word applied to this case.
58. S.T.C. Nov. 6, 2012 (S.T.C., No. 198, FJ 8) (Spain).
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society. This applies distinctively to the category of the institutional
guarantee, because it conveys institutions whose content is not perfectly shaped in the constitution.59
The Court uses two rationales to demonstrate that because samesex marriage is integrated in juridical culture, the Court may use juridical culture to interpret the definition of marriage. First, same-sex marriage has been regulated in other countries belonging to the same juridical tradition, which the Court considers fits in its juridical
systems.60 The second rationale relies on data provided by the Spanish
Center for Sociological Research—a major supporter of same-sex marriage in Spanish society.61 The Court depicts the “new image” of marriage after the Civil Code’s amendment as a “community of affection
that creates a bond,” or a
society of mutual help between two persons who bear an equal position in the relationship, who freely decide to unite themselves in a
project of common family life, giving their consent to the rights and
duties of the institution, and express it in compliance with the formalities stated in the Law.62

Several problems arise from both of these rationales.
It is difficult to believe that the changes introduced in the definition of marriage are not essential. Deprived of the heterosexual component—or as the dissenting opinions of Judge Rodriguez described,
deprived of any biological element—marriage would be a union of two
free individuals, without any other requirement or imperative purpose.63 The requirement that marriage must be based on affection is
not feasible from a juridical perspective, as it is based on will. Therefore, true will without affection is valid and marriage without true will
is void, even if there is affection.64 Moreover, the only way for marriage
to survive would be if many “communities of affection” with a potential

59. Id. at FJ 9.
60. Id. (Aragón, J., concurring) (explaining that the Judgment does not distinguish between countries that have an institutional guarantee of marriage in their Constitution and those
that do not).
61. S.T.C. Nov. 28, 2012 (B.O.E. No. 286, p. 168, FJ 9) (Spain). It is surprising that the
Judgment does not mention the data from the National Institute for Statistics, representing the
reality—rather than the perceptions—of same-sex marriages and same sex couples in Spain. See
infra Part VI discussing social demand.
62. Id.
63. Id. (Arribas, J., dissenting) (arguing that this change is a leap that lacks all logic).
64. See Report of the Royal Academy, supra note 11, at 941.

457

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 27

for reproduction, other than that of a man and a woman, are established. The concept proposed by the Constitutional Court is so wide
that unions of two relatives or two friends for any purpose easily fit
within that description. Marriage, therefore, would become an aimless
institution, or put another way, a multiple-aim, all-purpose institution.
Both the Royal Academy and the General Council of the Judiciary
understand that the Spanish Constitution protects marriage as a juridical entity with certain specific features, including heterosexuality. According to the Academy, the institutional guarantee places some limits
on the juridical developments of marriage because marriage enjoys a
fixed content (including a man-woman relationship), together with
other contingent features, and precludes public powers from passing
laws that may suppress the structural elements, change its content, or
create parallel legal entities to reach the same goal.65 The Report of
the General Council of the Judiciary strongly endorses this idea and
devotes several pages to explain it on the grounds of the structure of
Section 32 of the constitution.66 According to the Report, Section 321 contains the definition of marriage and the core elements that cannot
be changed—heterosexuality is among them.67 Neither lawmakers nor
Courts are allowed to modify it, because of the institutional guarantee.68 Section 32-2, conversely, comprises various elements that may
be regulated in different ways according to the social perception of the
institution or the political reasons of the legislature since this Section
would not be under the institutional protection of the marriage umbrella.69
On the subject of the role of social perception in the interpretation
of the constitution, there is a fundamental distinction between two realities that must be taken into account. The constitution is a norm
aimed to last for a long period of time. Thus it must be applied to new,
unforeseen situations and interpreted according to reality and constitutional principles. This is different from changing the principles
themselves, that is to say removing the foundations of the political and
social order and replacing them with new ones. Therefore, if the public
authorities understand that society has changed to the extent that its

65. Id. at 937. The Report mentions other examples of constitutional facts that enjoy that
institutional guarantee, like private property or inheritance mortis causa.
66. Council of the Judiciary, supra note 10, at 27–28.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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constitutional definition of marriage is not accurate any more, they
must propose a change to the constitution. But they cannot do it
through a broad interpretation of the text in force that surpasses the
acceptable limits.70 If the significance of marriage, or any other legal
institution that enjoys an institutional guarantee, could be freely modified, its configuration would be subject to change along ideological
lines by the Government in power.71 The constitution would lose its
character of supreme norm, at least in the Spanish legal system, where
any change or amendment to the constitution can only occur by means
of a special procedure that requires the agreement of a qualified majority of both houses—Congress and the Senate.72
This argument is also developed in one of the dissenting opinions,
arguing that it is not acceptable to force an interpretation of the constitution, or to make it say what it never wanted to say. The Court
cannot override the foundations of society established in the constitution precisely to have a permanent reference for the fundamental principles of the social order. Otherwise, it implies that it is social behavior
that legitimizes the constitution and not the opposite.73 Legislators
should have proposed a change in the constitution if they thought that
Spanish society has changed so much as to set aside marriage and adopt
a new kind of union for the foundation of society. Judge Ollero who
wrote this dissenting opinion expressed his surprise that the legislators
understood that an amendment to the Civil Code was needed to include same-sex couples in the definition of marriage, but an amendment to section 32 of the constitution was not needed when in fact
both dispositions have similar content.74

70. See id. at 38 for a more in-depth discussion.
71. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 25.
72. The Spanish Constitution reads:
1. Bills on constitutional amendment must be approved by a majority of three-fifths of
the members of each House. If there is no agreement between the Houses, an effort
to reach it shall be made by setting up a Joint Commission of Deputies and Senators
which shall submit a text to be voted on by the Congress and the Senate.
2. If approval is not obtained by means of the procedure outlined in the foregoing
clause, and provided that the text has been passed by an absolute majority of the members of the Senate, Congress may pass the amendment by a two thirds vote in favour.
3. Once the amendment has been passed by the Cortes Generales, it shall be submitted
to ratification by referendum, if so requested by one tenth of the members of either
House within fifteen days after its passage.
C.E. art. 167.
73. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 28.
74. S.T.C. Nov. 28, 2012 (Spain) (Ollero, J., dissenting).
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In fact, the Spanish Constitution was previously amended precisely
because of a change in society. Specifically, the constitution was
amended when Spain became a full member of the European Union.
After joining the European Union, the Spanish Constitution was modified to allow all Europeans to vote in local elections, a privilege only
given to Spaniards until then. Nobody, including the Court itself, considered “Spaniards” to be broadly interpreted as to include European
non-Spaniards, even though the constitution did not expressly define
“Spaniards.” The Court did not evolve the term, and the constitution
was modified.75
The argument of the evolution of society is still awkward when we
see how it is plainly ignored in other cases. An example of this is Section 57 of the constitution, which establishes the regular order of succession to the throne. According to the first paragraph, males would
always have preference over females.76 Even though the equality between men and women is a long established principle in society, much
more so than same-sex marriage, nobody ever understood the evolution of society and the general acceptance of equality principles would
allow a King’s older, female descendent to inherit the Crown if the
Prince were still alive. Certainly, many voices asked for the abolition
of this order of succession, but always knew that it required a change
in the constitution. Perhaps the complicated procedure to amend it is
the reason this proposal was never seriously considered. It seems that
in some situations admitting the evolution of society as a preeminent
standard of interpretation of the norms is easier than in others.

VI. The Reasoning of the Social Demand
Social demand itself is not reason enough to make a juridical
change constitutionally acceptable. All laws must be consistent with
the constitutional principles. Nonetheless, social demand is not totally
irrelevant. From a juridical point of view, social demand may make a

75. Id.
76. The Spanish Constitution reads:
The Crown of Spain shall be inherited by the successors of H.M. Juan Carlos I de
Borbon, the legitimate heir of the historic dynasty. Succession to the throne shall follow the regular order of primogeniture and representation, in the following order of
precedence: the earlier shall precede the later lines; within the same line, the closer
degree shall precede the more distant; within the same degree, the male shall precede
the female, and for the same sex, the older shall precede the younger.
C.E. art. 57.1.

460

443]

Spanish Law on Same-Sex Marriage

certain juridical option more accurate than another when achieving a
specific aim. The Council of State, in the final comments of the Report, says that any innovation on the matter of marriage should be
backed by a broad social consensus, due to the need for juridical certainty and stability.77 The Report stresses that a gradual approach, rather than a traumatic change would be preferable, even if that means
not recognizing the “right [of homosexual couples] to marry.”78
However, the urgency of responding to a compelling social demand was another one of the Spanish Government’s reasons to pass
the Bill on same-sex marriage. Both the Vice-president and the Secretary for Justice asserted that the high number of homosexual couples
that were waiting for a decision was a decisive factor in drafting the
bill. Certainly, the high prevalence of a behavior does not make it legal.
But the number of people potentially affected is somewhat unclear.
Most of the data the government offered was based on “estimations”—
the only reliable way to present a private reality that is not based on
any kind of register, evidence, or compulsory declaration, like sexual
orientation.
Perhaps for these reasons, government estimates seemed to far exceed reality. I will set aside comments about other expressions on that
matter that would need a bit more accuracy as well, for example the
words of the Vice-President who said that this law brought to an end
centuries of discrimination against homosexuals.79 The Secretary for
Justice, even more enthusiastically, talked about thousands of years of
discrimination, probably without realizing that thousands of years ago
homosexual behavior was widespread and accepted in some Mediterranean cultures, although there never was any intent to regard homosexual relationships as marriages.80
With regards to the numbers, I will limit the reference to the data
offered by the government, without analyzing other estimates offered
by the juridical literature on the topic that vary so widely from one
author to another that it makes it difficult to come to any conclusion.
The Vice-President said that there were about four million homosexuals in Spain, that is to say around 9% of the total population in 2005.
The Secretary for Justice added that although there were only 11,000
homosexual couples in the census by then (0.1% of the total number
77.
78.
79.
80.

Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 28.
Id.
Press Report, supra note 48.
See Kenneth Dover, Greek Homosexuality (1978).
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of couples), they thought this percentage would soon rise to 10% after
the approval of the Law. Perhaps the Secretary of Justice had second
thoughts and made it clear that the issue at stake was not the number
of people in same-sex relationships, but the general recognition of a
right until then denied.
The data provided by the National Institute for Statistics shows
that a total of 22,104 marriages have been celebrated since the approval
of the Law until the end of 2011.81 That means that 44,208 persons
wanted to enter into same-sex marriages. The obvious question is what
happens with the other 3,955,792 estimated homosexuals, or more, as
the total Spanish population continued increasing since 2005. Of
course, some of them would not want to marry, but is there not as high
a prevalence of homosexuality in society, or is the Law a failure, insofar
as only 1.1% of the estimated target was actually benefited by the Law?
It is worth noting that the content of the Law cannot be challenged in
this case because nothing else can be attributed to same-sex couples.
Furthermore, the average percentage of same-sex marriages celebrated is 1.8% of the total number of marriages82 but 36.5% of samesex marriages had at least one non-Spaniard, while this percentage was
20.9% of heterosexual couples.
It is the sociologist’s job to interpret the data, analyzing its variations and explaining the tendencies in society they display. But it is far
from clear that the high demand the government claimed was real in
Spanish society.

VII. Conclusion
The ruling of the Constitutional Court upholding the Same-SexMarriage Law lays to rest the discussion on this matter, but it will not
be the end of the overall debate. Not all public institutions, as we have
seen, and certainly not the whole of society, as the Constitutional
Court recognizes,83 share the idea that marriage can change its nature.
The word now depicts such a different relationship as the new image of
marriage defined in the judgment. Moreover, the conclusion of the
Constitutional Court must be understood in its proper terms. It says
81. Nat’l Institute for Statistics, http://www.ine.es (last visited March 29, 2013).
82. This percentage rises every year 0.1% although the number of same-sex marriages
does not vary widely because the total number of marriages is decreasing. This difference is wider
in the provisional numbers provided from the last year, when the total number of marriages decreased 4.4% and same-sex marriages increased 0.5%.
83. See S.T.C. Nov. 28, 2012 (Spain).
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that the amendment of the Civil Code that introduced same-sex marriage is, in its opinion, consistent with the constitution. But it did not
say that it was demanded by the constitutional principles. Besides, the
court stated that the other possible option, reserving marriage to heterosexual unions and granting homosexual unions other regulation,
would also be consistent with the constitution.84
But even if the door appears to be open for a law protecting marriage, it seems that the debate will be restricted, in the near future,
mainly to the academic field. There is not a political will to change the
current status of marriage. The political party now in power, which is
different from the one that approved the law, has improperly used this
judgment as an excuse to avoid the matter. According to the Secretary
for Justice, the Government is bound by this judgment.85 Surely, judgments bind the courts in the sense that they must apply the law, but
nothing would prevent this government from passing another bill regulating marriage as a heterosexual union if they consider that it is the
right way to protect this institution.
In any case, we cannot forget that the fundamental issue that underlies the conflict. The irreconcilable opposition of two ideas of marriage: a union oriented to the constitution of a family with a potential
for reproduction and a projection on time, and marriage as a union
based on affection, where bearing children or enduring through time
are not necessarily essential. There seems to be no meeting point of
these two extremes even without taking into account the ideological
component that more often than not intermingles in the debate. Thus
the future of the definition of marriage, even with no foreseeable
changes in the immediate aftermath of the judgment of the Constitutional Court, is not definitively settled.

84. Id.
85. Gallardón: “No modificaré la ley y la dejaré exactamente como está,” El País (Nov. 7, 2012,
2:27 AM), http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/11/06/actualidad/1352226880 _949406.html.
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